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Manifestation of Authoritarian Resilience?:
Evolution of Property Management in Beijing*1
Yousun Chung
This article discusses how middle-class homeowners in urban China have made advancement in 
collective interest representation and thus protection of private property rights in more systematic 
ways: not just by contending but by participating in public policy process. This is quite salient in their 
participation in relevant legislation, from the Property Law in 2007 to the Ordinance on Property 
Management in Beijing in 2010 and a new version of property management-related local legislation 
underway. Further investigation of this topic sheds lights on theoretical issues of in what ways and to 
what extents the state-society interaction in contemporary China is evolving.
Keywords: Homeowners, Private Property Rights, Public Policy Process, Participation, 
Legislation, State-Society Interaction
1. INTRODUCTION
How to explain resilience and sustainability of an authoritarian regime has been an 
intriguing question to the students of Chinese politics. Since Andrew Nathan’s clairvoyant 
work which has highlighted the concept of “authoritarian resilience”(Nathan, 2003), the so-
called “authoritarianism with adjectives” literature flourished in the recent decade: flexible/ 
modernized authoritarianism (Cabestan, 2004), adaptive authoritarianism (Shambaugh, 
2008), fragmented authoritarianism 2.0 (Mertha, 2009), deliberative authoritarianism (He and 
Thøgersen, 2010; He and Warren, 2011), contentious authoritarianism (Chen, 2011), attentive 
authoritarianism (Perry, 2012), consultative authoritarianism (Teets, 2013), bargained 
authoritarianism (Lee and Zhang, 2013), and responsive authoritarianism (Heurlin, 2016) are 
such examples.
Such trend reflects that the main dependent variable in Chinese politics has gradually 
moved from democracy to governance: that is, rather than trying to find ideal forms of 
“civil society” in China, understanding how China is actually working—how state and 
society interacts while utilizing limited institutional arrangements—has become the focus 
of academic analysis. In other words, understanding how a non-competitive authoritarian 
regime such as China provides accountability, transparency, responsiveness, and efficiency 
and thus remain sustainable has become important (Tsai, 2015). China is currently situated 
at the turning point from making quantitative growth to qualitative growth. Unprecedented 
diverse socio-economic issues have emerged, and Chinese citizens gush out complaints 
about government policies in regards to issues they are concerned about. Chinese society has 
become volatile and turbulent, resembling a “volcano” (Whyte, 2010). How the Chinese state 
adroitly copes with the growing contention over socio-economic issues will determine the 
sustainability of the one party rule. In that sense, it is worth to take a close look at how the 
Chinese state deals with diversifying demands from society.
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Among many socio-economic issues, this article focuses on private property rights and 
the changing mode of state-society interaction in this issue domain. Main social actors are 
urban middle-class homeowners who are well aware of their legal rights over the purchased 
properties. What is notable about them is that they have relatively high degree of political 
awareness and sensitivity.1 They started to mobilize themselves and find ways to defend 
their interests in sophisticated ways, from waging contentious activities for rights claiming 
to seeking participation in relevant policy processes. Now they have established virtual 
countrywide networks, and have begun to share successful stories and legal strategies. 
In what ways and to what extent have urban homeowners been able to influence public 
governance in the given issue domain? In other words, in what ways and to what extent have 
urban homeowners been able to achieve political efficacy albeit at a limited level? What 
implication does it offer to the sustainability of an authoritarian regime? Finding answers 
to these questions lead us to a nuanced understanding of state-society interaction in the 
present-day China. Over the past few decades, the dynamics in the commodified housing 
(shangpinfang) sector has evolved towards supporting further representation of homeowner 
interests. Reflecting homeowners’ voices to local legislation succinctly shows such 
advancement and this insinuates important change in the ways the state perceives and treats 
urban homeowners: from suspicion about newly emerged social actors to their inclusion in 
relevant policy process. Of course, achievements and limits are simultaneously observed in 
this evolutionary process, and it is still too early to draw any definitive conclusions about 
the future direction of the state-society interaction. The aim of this article is to understand 
ongoing empirical phenomena in an important socio-economic issue domain and lay the 
groundwork for further discussion of state-society relations in China as well as resilience of 
an authoritarian regime. 
This article describes the current state-society dynamics in the commodified housing 
sector based on cumulative fieldwork conducted in Beijing since 2009. More specifically, 
the process through which a new local legislation on property management has emerged 
in Beijing around 2010 is discussed as a core case. This article traces the process through 
which homeowners have participated in recent local legislation in Beijing around 2010 and 
thereafter. It includes in-depth interviews with local scholars, government officials, and 
homeowner activists who have been involved in such local legislations. The remainder of 
this article is presented as follows. The next section proposes a framework for discussing 
evolution of state-society interaction. The following section introduces the case and its 
background. Analysis is offered in three phases: macro-legal environment, policy making 
process, and policy implementation/ feedback. The article ends with a brief summary, 
discussion of theoretical implication, and suggestion for future work on this subject. 
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Unlike in competitive authoritarianism, electoral competition and legislature do not 
play much role in a regime such as China. Thus, a nuanced understanding of state-society 
1 While electing their own representatives, urban homeowners experience “elections” in their daily life. 
Moreover, they are interested in participating in the existing electoral institutions even though such 
institutions have flaws. Residents Committees or People’s Congress at grassroots are such targets. 
For instance, see Guan and Cai (2015).
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interaction becomes more necessary for comprehending authoritarian resilience: that is, 
how the Chinese state aptly deals with complaints, conflicts, and contentions coming out of 
the society, and in what alternative ways the Chinese state gains legitimacy. Coercion (or 
repression) still remains as a valid tool of authoritarian governance (Yang, 2017). However, 
choice of coercive measures accompany costs that the regime does not want—such as loss 
of legitimacy—thus finding a balance between repression and concession through “political 
arrangement” seems to be a reasonable choice of the state (Cai, 2008).2 As such, it is 
worthwhile to delve into how the Chinese state has made efforts towards deploying non-
coercive ways to govern and how this contributes to the sustainability of an authoritarian 
regime.
The state-society relations in contemporary China could be depicted as a strategic 
interaction between the two. Chinese state authority has started to pay attention to the 
demands of the society and, accordingly, the room for citizens to influence public policy is 
gradually on the rise. It is because the state-society interaction has become the process of 
negotiating and exchanging interest representation and regime legitimacy. While it does not 
rely on competing parties and representative bodies, the Chinese state does have to show its 
capacity to deal with the growing interest articulation by its constituencies (Chung, 2015). 
Securing stability is connected to confirming its legitimacy to govern society. Frequently, 
the state even makes intentional efforts to “buy stability” and pro-actively monitor protests 
and gather information about citizen complaints. Moreover, the state acts on such gathered 
information (Heurlin, 2016). By doing so, an authoritarian state shows its own adaptation 
to the rapidly changing reality. In this vein, social actors’ participation in public governance 
is an advanced form of communication between the state and society. How it helps and 
undergirds authoritarian governance needs further study. 
Against such backdrop, in what ways and to what extent social actors are able to influence 
public governance in China? The state-society interaction can take many forms, and the ways 
and extents social actors can influence public policy differ across issue domains. Given such 
possibility of variations, it is hard to make an all-around generalization about state-society 
interaction with one sentence. Thus, for a comparative and comprehensive understanding 
of state-society interaction, we can formulate a two by two table as the following. To put it 
simply, a state strategy can take either strong or soft form; the same can be applied to society 
strategies. More specifically, strategies by state may form a spectrum, from dire repression 
to cooperation with society. Similarly, strategies by society may have another spectrum, 
from determined resistance to cooperation with the state (Hsu and Chang, 2016). What has 
been projected by Table 1 does not necessarily mean that the division between strong and 
soft strategies is dichotomous. Rather, it insinuates a range of possible options that could be 
deployed by both the state and society actors.   
The issue domain that will be discussed in this article belongs to the category III. The 
current state-society interaction regarding private property rights represents “soft-soft 
interaction,” in which both state and society actors intend to build collaborative ties with each 
other. It is conjectured that the possibility of policy change is relatively high in this category. 
Discussing one specific category of state-society interaction has shortcomings in producing 
all-encompassing generalization. Yet, it can still show what soft-soft interaction, which is 
2 According to Cai (2008), authoritarian resilience is explained by “political arrangements (which) 
grant conditional autonomy (to local governments).” Such idea could be stretched to the relations 
between the state and society. 
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visibly increasing in numbers as a form of state-society interaction in contemporary China, 
can produce as a result. In regards to the research question posed above—to what extent 
social actors in China can bring changes to governance—to postulate, soft-soft interaction 
may not bring dramatic changes to governance itself. Yet it is expected to bring about some 
changes in the quality of governance. While it may be seen as limited achievements of social 
actors, such piecemeal change contributes to the broader goal of the CCP’s keeping in power 
(Stockmann and Gallagher, 2011). This point will be revisited at the end of this article.
3. CASE: A NEW MODE OF PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN BEIJNG
Urban homeowners (yezhu) are characterized by their acquisition of purchased property. 
However, what the issue of private property rights conveys is more than material. Being 
equipped with a strong awareness of rights and with resources to actively defend their rights, 
these social actors are different from their counterparts at the periphery, such as peasants and 
laborers. In other words, as relative winners of reform,3 these people who are often classified 
as “middle-class” have explored their relationship with the state in more skillful ways. Early 
works find that the interests of homeowners collide with the interests of the state (especially 
the local state). The state has not been active in processing the requests from homeowners 
which is clearly identifying property rights. Or the state has often been delaying or disturbing 
such process. For instance, establishing a Homeowners Committee was a difficult task. Local 
state agencies at grassroots level such as street offices (jiedaoban) and residents committees 
(juweihui) were reluctant to grant permission (Read, 2003; Cai, 2005; Tomba, 2005; Shi and 
Cai, 2006).
However, gradually, some meaningful changes have occurred in the relationship between 
homeowners and the state. While they have not directly challenged the state authority and 
have rather raised incessant complaints, homeowner activism has been effective in requesting 
more responsibility from the state in clearly defining and guaranteeing protection of private 
property rights. One such salient example is homeowner activists’ participation in local 
legislation. The local state in Beijing, through the Beijing Housing Construction Committee 
(Beijing Zhujianwei) which is the main state actor in property management, has clearly and 
openly expressed its position to allow more room for homeowner interest representation. The 
3 It could also be said that they have benefited from the state project of creating housing market and 
consumers. Bargain sale of work unit housing to employees and many other subsidization policies 
followed to boost the nascent housing market during the 1990s (Tomba, 2014).






Note: possibility of change in governance or policy: IV > III > II > I.
Source: Hsu and Chang (2016). 
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Ordinance on Property Management in Beijing (Beijingshi Wuye Guanli Banfa) announced in 
May 20104 has essentialized such changes. 
Several key features in this Ordinance draw attention: (1) it clearly states that 
homeowners are the main actors of property management (yezhu zixing guanli); (2) more 
specific steps regarding the establishment of homeowner organizations (i.e. Homeowners 
Committees (yezhu weiyuanhui) and Homeowners Assemblies (yezhu dahui)) have been 
suggested, for instance, an inclusion of a preparation team (choubeizu), an inclusion of a pre-
registration process (beian), implementation of a fixed-term appointment system with partial 
re-election (renqizhi), and an establishment of a board of supervisors (jianshehui); and (3) 
ideas about how to make homeowner organizations substantial entities (shitihua) have been 
suggested, including securing full-time staffs equipped with professional knowledge about 
property management. 
In particular, with regards to substantializing homeowner organizations, the idea of 
turning Homeowners Assemblies into legal entities (faren) is noteworthy. Considering that 
the legitimate status of homeowner organizations has not been clearly confirmed as of yet, 
such an idea proposed by the new Ordinance has been regarded as a revolutionary move. 
According to the new Ordinance, it is now possible for a Homeowners Assembly, which 
represents the total number of homeowners in a given neighborhood, to be registered as a 
legal entity. Having acquired legal status, a Homeowners Assembly can be the main actor in 
litigation, fund management, and interaction with the state. In addition, the deputy director 
of the Beijing Housing Construction Committee, who has played a key role in the process of 
preparing the Ordinance, confirmed the changed stance of the local state through publicizing 
documents which he had personally authored.5 
Yet, instead of a full-scale application of the newly proposed agenda of turning 
Homeowners Assemblies into legal entities (yezhu dahui farenhua), the situation in Beijing 
is that an “experimental application” in a specific district has been completed and then 
halted. A full-scale incorporation of Homeowners Assemblies in Beijing will need some 
more time. This experimental incorporation plan has garnered mixed reviews when it was 
first launched by Beijing municipal government. Some have welcomed it as a meaningful 
breakthrough in the history of Beijing homeowner activism while others have responded 
with skepticism discounting that it is but a hollow experiment. Despite many loopholes and 
uncertainty, the very fact that such an experiment has been attempted denotes a big change in 
local governance. Moreover, it should be noted that social inputs have drawn out such policy 
outputs. In this vein, the new mode of property management in Beijing is discussed as a core 
case. 
Even though some limitations have been noticed, the case of local legislation in Beijing 
in 2010 is not necessarily a failure. Because of fierce contest between the two camps which 
stand for vested interests and new interests (citizens’ interests), respectively, the experimental 
application in one district could not be expanded to apply across the city. Leadership change 
in the Beijing Housing Construction Committee followed as well. However, governance is 
about solving problems through institutionalized ways, and such attempts are under way. 
After an experimental attempt around 2010 had ended in incompletion, problems regarding 
property management remained and citizens’ requests of responsibility in governance have 
4 The Ordinance went into effect in October 2010. For the full text, see Zhongguowang (2010). 
5 A representative one is “Rebuilding Property Management with Chinese Characteristics (Zhongguo 
Tese Wuye Guanli Moshide Zaizao)” which has been publicized on-line.
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continued. Thus, another round of social participation in property management is going on. 
The Beijing city is preparing a new version of local legislation on property management, 
involving new actors such as Association of Lawyers in the Beijing city (Beijingshi lüshi 
xiehui) and People’s Congress in the Beijing city (Beijingshi Renda). What has happened at 
the previous stage laid the foundation for the current development. 
A few brief notes on why Beijing has been chosen as the core case should be mentioned 
here. Beijing is a pioneer in the overall movement of homeowner activism in China (and 
social movements in other issue domains as well). In terms of state-society interaction, the 
attitude of the local state in Beijing is regarded as one of the most progressive, when taking 
into account the extent that the local state accepts and responds to voices from society.6 The 
new Ordinance issued by Beijing’s municipal government in 2010 has been regarded as the 
most progressive interpretation of the Property Law which came out in early 2007 (Interview 
August 2012). Although it cannot be argued that what happened in Beijing is representative 
of overall changes occurring in China, it satisfies some conditions to be considered a 
critically groundbreaking case. It has future expandability as well: once institutionalized, the 
Beijing case is highly likely to be expanded to other areas.7 
4. CHANGING DYNAMICS
4.1 Phase One: Changes in Macro Legal Environment
Up until the 2000s, the macro legal environment that undergirds the protection of private 
property rights had been quite murky. Two higher laws with a nationwide application 
scope had emerged: the Property Law (wuquanfa) in 2007 and the Ordinance on Property 
Management (wuye guanli tiaoli) in 2003 and then 2007. Whereas the former had defined 
ownership broadly, the latter had suggested necessary conditions for establishing and 
managing homeowner organizations. In this big framework, many details were missing 
for actual practice of the property rights. The initial version of the Ordinance on Property 
Management (2003) had come out much earlier than the Property Law (2007), creating an 
ironic situation in which many clauses regarding homeowner organizations in the Ordinance 
were not being backed by the highest law of the country. Some murky clauses of the 
Property Law, because they left much room for interpretation, have been denounced harshly.8 
The actual interpretation and implementation of property rights had thus fallen under the 
discretion of local governments.  
In Beijing, prior to the emergence of the new version in 2010, the earlier version of the 
local ordinance on property management was the one issued in 1995, the Ordinance on 
Community Management in Beijing (beijingshi zhuzhai xiaoqu guanli banfa). The period 
between two local ordinances regarding property management (1995~2010) had literally 
been a grey period. A few implications could be drawn about this period. First, the lack of 
clearly defined legal environment for property rights, unexpectedly, gave some space for 
6 Fulda et al. (2012) has shown how social actors in Beijing, despite their relative inferiority in power 
relations, can access the state proactively and induce changes.
7 Comparative case studies, if available and possible, will enhance generalizability.
8 For instance, unclearly defined divisional ownership (qufen suoyouquan) has brought about much 
controversy.
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social power to grow. One homeowner activist commented, “In a sense, after the issuance of 
a very specific local ordinance with legal effect, I am afraid that social space will shrink. As 
everything was murky, we had more freedom (Interview August 2012).” Such remark reveals 
that the lack of clearly defined institutional environment was perceived as a window of 
opportunity for social actors to utilize. Second, both the local state and society did not have 
enough information about the real intentions of the other party in the beginning; through 
frequent encounters in various forms, both parties went through a period of mutual learning 
and understanding. Many homeowner activists testify that the suspicious and hostile attitude 
of the state towards them gradually ameliorated (Interviews August 2012 and August 2014). 
It testifies the state’s changed perception toward these social actors.9  
Throughout this unclearly defined transition period, homeowners as aggregated social 
power have emerged and grown. Homeowners responded to perceived opportunities by 
mobilizing themselves and turning them into actors who can effectively represent and 
deliver collective interest of homeowners. It is well-known that, with the emergence of 
commodified housing, homeowners have started to form Homeowners Committees in each 
neighborhood as a representative organization with their interests at heart. Homeowners who 
have purchased housings in a given neighborhood, elected their representatives and utilized 
their leaders and organizations to convey their complaints about housing maintenance, 
living environment, and general quality of life to housing business actors (such as real estate 
developers and property management companies) and relevant government units (Read, 
2003; Cai, 2005; Tomba, 2005; Shi and Cai, 2006). 
In the early stage of housing commodification, many conflicts surrounding property 
management have occurred between housing business actors and homeowners, because 
of their different expectations. Some initial conflicts emanated from developers who have 
built housing with poor quality. Others emanated from lack of clearly specified property 
ownership (suoyouquan). More conflicts occurred surrounding the issue of how the 
purchased properties are managed, including maintaining communal public facilities such as 
elevators, green space, and parking lots, and providing security and cleaning services in the 
residential complexes. Homeowners Committees have played an important role in conveying 
residents’ complaints regarding these issues to other relevant actors. For instance, based 
on the approval of a majority of homeowners, Homeowners Committees have attempted 
to dismiss unsatisfactory management companies and recruit new ones. They also resorted 
to collecting petitions, initiating litigations and pursuing collective action to articulate and 
defend homeowners’ interests.
As time went on, horizontal linkages that connect Homeowners Committees across 
multiple neighborhoods have emerged. This means that homeowners have started to mobilize 
themselves beyond the state-set boundaries of individual neighborhoods (Yip and Jiang, 
2011; Chung, 2015). As further aggregated social force, horizontal linkages of homeowners 
across the city have enabled better representation of collective interest of homeowners. Soon, 
horizontal linkages of homeowners became the main actors representing society in this issue 
domain. Change of macro legal environment such as the emergence of the Property Law in 
2007 has offered opportunities for these social groups to come forward and raise their voices: 
open forums, press conferences, and signature-collecting campaigns followed. The main goal 
of their activities showed meaningful advancement: beyond fighting against vicious housing 
entrepreneurs, they now attempt to change rules and regulations that bind their rights over 
9 Regarding the process “mutual suspicion” is changed into “mutual benefit”, see Spires (2011).
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purchased properties.10
There are two representative horizontal linkages of homeowners in the Beijing city. One is 
Governance and Community Institute (hexie shequ fazhan zhongxin) and the other is Beijing 
Association of Homeowners’ Committees’ Bidding Committee (beijingshi yezhu weiyuanhui 
xiehui shenban weiyuanhui). The former purports to be a research-oriented organization. 
It interacts with homeowners and other actors through forums, seminars, and conferences. 
As a formally registered social organization, while avoiding direct confrontation with the 
state, it has developed with relative stability. In the case of the latter, members are heads of 
Homeowner Committees from multiple neighborhoods. It claims to be more independent 
and more directly representative of homeowner interests, and at the same time, not reluctant 
to wage aggressive strategies in its interaction with the state. It has been engaged in many 
neighborhoods disputes and have directly provided help to contending homeowners. 
These two organizations represent somewhat different stances towards interaction with 
the state. Compared with the former, the latter adopts relatively more aggressive behavioral 
strategies. The state responded also in different ways. The state granted formal legal status 
to the former while not granting such opportunity to the latter. However, the commonality 
of these two organizations has been that they have been steadily seeking engagement 
with the state. Social organizations in China have heuristically learned that, rather than 
seeking absolute autonomy, it helps their survival and development if they engage the state. 
Meanwhile, the state has also realized that interaction with these organizations—regardless 
of their specific differences—contributes to governance as the state can gather from these 
organizations information about issues that have growing importance in local society. The 
following sections demonstrate how these two horizontal linkages of homeowners have 
actively been involved in the relevant policy process.
4.2 Phase Two: Homeowners’ Participation in Local Legislation around 2010
At this stage, meaningful changes have occurred in the concept and practice of “property 
management (wuye guanli).” Property management is basically about material interests: 
homeowners care about how the quality, the comfort level, and the value of the property 
they have purchased are maintained. They get disgruntled when they feel that they do not 
get the due service in proportion to the management service fee they pay. Moreover, they 
feel helpless when they find they cannot dismiss an unsatisfactory management company 
at will. The underlying problem is more than material: it concerns who becomes the main 
actor controlling property management, through which mechanism clashes of interests 
are discussed, and whether homeowners’ interests are enhanced through such process. As 
conflicts in commodified residential complexes increase in number, the state has begun to 
take note of the seriousness of this underlying issue.
The changed perception of the state on property management has been confirmed through 
many examples of evidence. Through the 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party, the central state mentioned that “grassroots self-governance is one important self-
governance pushed by the PRC (jiceng zizhishi zhonggong zizhi zhiyi).”11 Such a statement 
10 Given this development, Homeowners Committees in individual neighborhoods are not the focus of 
this article. 
11 For the full text of what has been discussed at the 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist 
Party, see Zhongguowang (2007). 
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implies that top leaders have started to regard self-governance of urban residents as important 
as the self-governance of ethnic minorities in the country, and that promoting the self-
governance of urban residents is included in the macro-level policy directions of the central 
state. The stance of the Beijing local state seemed being along these same lines. In preparing 
a new version of local ordinance around 2010, the Beijing municipal government has shown 
a willingness to allow more room for homeowners’ rights in deciding the matters that are 
germane to their everyday life within residential complexes. Although there is much to 
be done to achieve self-governance in a truer sense, through the promulgation of the new 
Ordinance in 2010, at least some more feasible action plans to engage or absorb citizen 
requests have been suggested.   
Incessant complaints and requests from society have played a certain role in inducing 
such a change in the mindset of the state. The primary target of complaints by homeowners 
has been housing business actors. Local state in general or specific state agencies related to 
the property management have also become the target of homeowner complaints. The Beijing 
Housing and Construction Committee used to receive 6000 cases of complaints or disputes 
annually, which is a considerable administrative burden (Interview August 2012).12 An 
official in the Housing Construction Committee acknowledged that they have been paying 
close attention to the strengthened rights awareness and advancement and sophistication 
in the rights protection strategies by homeowners. He also added that not only his own 
agency but also many other relevant government agencies have become more aware of the 
importance of allowing and facilitating the growth of homeowner organizations, because 
such measure would ease their burden (Interview September 2012). 
Similarly, the change in the objective condition for property management business has 
also affected the mindset of relevant bureaucrats. Unlike in the past, property management 
is no longer likely to remain a lucrative business. Because of continuing inflation and 
homeowners’ general attitude of not welcoming increases in their service fees, many 
management companies now worry about deficit operation or even just maintaining the 
status quo. Supposing that such a situation becomes exacerbated, if the state remains the 
supporter of management companies which fall short of providing due quality service, the 
responsibility then falls onto the shoulders of the local state. Then the state should keep 
providing direct material subsidies to the malfunctioning management companies. “It would 
be like going back to the mode of property management prior to housing commodification, 
and the burden the state should take will be insurmountable,” an interviewee who is 
working as an adviser to the Beijing city government projected a dim future for the property 
management business (Interview September 2012).
Faced with such a situation, it has become a rational choice for the state to acknowledge 
and invite in homeowners as one of the main actors of property management. The state has 
begun to expect that such choice would have a dampening effect on the increasing trend of 
disputes in the commodified housing sector, and help enhance the long-term sustainability 
of property management (Interview September 2012). Out of the newly issued Ordinance 
in 2010, the policy agenda which has drawn the most attention is the one which turns 
Homeowners Assemblies into legal entities (faren). Strictly speaking, because of unresolved 
issues, the term “de facto legal entities” (shizhi faren) is used to refer to this agenda. To be 
a de facto legal entity, a Homeowners Assembly needs to be registered with the county/
12 However, the complaints directed to the Beijing Housing and Construction Committee decreased 
rapidly after the promulgation of the new local Ordinance in 2010 (Interview September 2012).
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township government and Street Office. The final ratification is completed with getting the 
stamp of the local Housing Land and Resource Bureau (fangdiju). Homeowners Assemblies 
as legal entities can open their own independent bank accounts and control funds such as 
management fees and public funding earmarked for repairs (gonggong weixiu jijin). Since 
fund control has been at the center of disputes in many residential complexes, the official 
goal of pushing this policy agenda is to mitigate disputes and homeowners’ dissatisfaction 
regarding property management. “By granting officially recognized legal status to 
homeowner organizations, we encourage homeowners to resolve issues through legitimate 
channels. It may help to either decrease or prevent disputes related to property management,” 
an official at the Beijing Housing Construction Committee foresaw (Interview September 
2012).
The changed policy position of the state is to actively recognize homeowner organizations 
and include them as partners in governance. Alternatively speaking, the state regards 
homeowners and their organizations as the main agents for outsourcing governance in a 
particular issue domain where the state’s continuously taking responsibility is inefficient and 
even risky. Under the previous workplace system (danweizhi), through the Housing Authority 
(i.e. fangguanju or fangguansuo), the state managed long-term rental of public housing. 
However, the state has recognized that such an administrative approach with the state 
taking responsibility in this manner would not work in commodified housing. Intensifying 
the responsibility of business actors has proven to be an inefficient solution as well. The 
alternative solution is for the state to give more leeway for homeowners to express their 
thoughts and to incorporate such thoughts to the actual property management in residential 
complexes. In dealing with these issues, the primary policy agency of the state is the Beijing 
Housing Construction Committee. Most of the important local regulations regarding property 
management are prepared by the Beijing Housing Construction Committee, even though such 
regulations are publicized by the Beijing city government. Given the characteristics of the 
property management which requires cooperation from many functional state agencies, state 
agencies in charge of taxes, public security, quality control, and civil affairs are also involved. 
In particular, for pushing forward the agenda of turning Homeowners Assemblies into legal 
entities, securing the agreement of these related functional agencies was crucial, as the 
required procedure dictates the final confirmation of legal status of Homeowners Assemblies 
depends on their consent. The Beijing Housing Construction Committee took initiatives in 
persuading these agencies—which did not welcome such an idea from the beginning—one 
by one (Interviews August and September 2012).
On the other hand, the fact that different levels or lines (xitong) of state agencies have 
different interests, and the tensions arising thereof between them are evident. Simply 
speaking, the Housing Construction Committee and lower level government organizations 
have different interests. Grassroots level government organizations, which have traditionally 
exerted territorial control in local society, still do not welcome homeowner organizations 
as their counterparts on an equal footing. Economic incentive also matters, since district 
governments and Street Offices often have symbiotic interests with business actors in the 
commodified housing sector. However, higher level governments or agencies (i.e., the Beijing 
City Government and Housing Construction Committee) have more interest in maintaining 
general stability, decreasing conflicts in residential complexes, and raising efficiency of 
community management. The diverging local state interests and goals denote fragmented 
state authority; when observed by social power, it can be utilized for achieving their goals 
(Spires, 2011). The interviewed homeowners were well aware of such possible access points 
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for them (Interviews August and September 2012).
To evaluate, the policy making process of the 2010 Ordinance contained some degrees 
of inclusiveness, responsiveness and deliberation, in the sense that there have been decision-
making state agencies’ opinion-gathering processes from social actors. While preparing 
the drafts for the new Ordinance, the Beijing Housing Construction Committee has held 
numerous public hearings (tingzhenghui)—opinions from legal professionals, officials in 
other related government agencies, business actors, and social activists have been actively 
sought.13 Well-known homeowner activists in the city mostly had the shared experience of 
being invited to attend such meetings prepared by relevant state agencies,14 with some being 
individually consulted as well. Aforementioned two horizontal linkages of homeowners 
across Beijing have also participated in such processes actively. The case of Beijing 
Association of Homeowners’ Committees’ Bidding Committee is more interesting: even 
though it does not have a formal legal status and tend to express critical opinions towards 
government policies without reserve, it has been frequently contacted and consulted.15 
Qualitative interviews also revealed that the idea of turning Homeowners Assemblies into 
legal entities has been actually proposed by homeowners themselves, rather than by state 
agencies (Interviews August and September 2012).
Besides the opinion-gathering platforms prepared by state agencies, the development of 
information technology has facilitated discussion between stakeholders of different stances. 
In addition to the traditional media (i.e. TV and newspapers), the influence of the new media 
is crucial in forming any kind of political discourse these days. Regardless of the intention 
of the state, the new media has contributed in raising the transparency of the policy making 
process, because the drafts of important policies are disclosed to the public through formal 
legal documents and through the internet immediately. For instance, microblogging (weibo) 
is quite popular among people who have an interest in socially sensitive issues. Through 
microblogs, homeowner activists and relevant state agencies, and even homeowners of 
different stances are able to have intense debates. One informant said, “I used to argue with 
those who are working in the Housing Construction Committee about the new version of 
local legislation. I gushed out critical opinions without reserve. After a few intense debates, 
they disappeared from the web space. Maybe they were offended by my criticism.” (Interview 
September 2012). As such, online discussion also worked as a venue through which the local 
state and social actors can interact and exchange opinions with.16 
On the other hand, pluralization of the policy making process means that instead of 
there being just one strand of interest groups to pressure policy makers, now multiple 
interest groups can be involved. Thus policy making state agencies can face difficulties in 
compromising with different interests or face repercussions afterwards. The changed policy 
stance of the Beijing city government sides more with homeowners rather than business 
13 According to He and Warren (2011), these are “deliberate” mechanisms that undergird Chinese 
authoritarianism.
14 One homeowner activist testified that the number of meetings (huiyi) he has participated is over 
twenty. He also added that he has contributed to making at least four clauses of the 2010 Ordinance 
(Interview September 2014).
15 Regarding similar cases of environmental NGOs, Yang (2008) points out that this shows the state’s 
tolerance of spontaneous social groups in the given issue domain. 
16 On-line forum of homeowners facilitate interaction among them within neighborhoods as well (Li 
and Li, 2013).
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actors. On many occasions before and after the promulgation of the new Ordinance, the 
deputy director of the Beijing Housing Construction Committee then (who is named 
Zhang Nongke) has openly acknowledged the shortcomings and malpractices of property 
management practices of the past.17 He also had a clear sense about which direction 
upcoming local legislation should go. This has been received as a surprise since it is not easy 
for a leader of a government agency which oversees property management of the whole city 
to openly acknowledge the problems of his own agency. Most interviewees I have met with 
have commonly pointed out the importance of the individual leader which made possible 
the recent progressive move by the Housing Construction Committee (Interviews September 
2012 and September 2014). 
To summarize, at this stage, social actors’ participation in public governance—agenda-
setting and decision-making—has been duly noted. It was possible since local state 
made some changes in its perception towards homeowners and property management. A 
reform minded leader in the core agency relevant to property management had interests 
and initiatives in interacting with social actors. Interview accounts backs up this was not 
perfunctory gestures but strenuous efforts for better communication made by the Beijing 
Housing Construction Committee then (Interviews August and September 2012). Eventually, 
a new local legislation has come to contain many clauses allowing more room for homeowner 
interest representation, including turning Homeowners Assemblies (Yezhu Dahui) into legal 
entities (faren) as a representative example. 
4.3 Phase Three: Homeowners’ Participation in Implementation and Feedback
In regards to the implementation of the new Ordinance, a two-track approach has been 
attempted: (1) by the state directly; and (2) by the state-sponsored social organizations. 
The former track refers to the state-directed experimental implementation of Homeowners 
Assembly incorporation. It is exclusive-scope experimentation in one specific district in 
Beijing. The latter track refers to the state-sponsored social organizations’ facilitation of 
establishing homeowner organizations across the city. In the former, in the experimental 
district, Homeowners Committees and Homeowners Assemblies have been established 
in every community, showing a one hundred percent establishment rate. Such state-
directed implementation has met criticism. Some have depicted it as “planned economy-
style implementation (jihua jingji fangshi)” and “forced democracy (beiminzhu),” showing 
disappointment about the way such an agenda gets implemented (Interviews September 
2012). 
In the latter track, to facilitate the establishment of homeowner organizations across 
the city, the local state supported establishing two “guidance centers (budao zhongxin)” 
in late 2011. Two well-known homeowner activists in the city each direct one of these 
guidance centers.18 The stated goals of these centers include: helping the establishment 
of homeowner organizations, educating and producing human resources equipped with 
professional knowledge in property management, and building platforms for exchange and 
17 Mr. Zhang Nongke was recruited from outside. As he is not a lifelong bureaucrat, he did not 
have entrenched interests with relevant stakeholders and was able to take bold steps to intensify 
homeowners’ voices vis-à-vis those of business actors. 
18 The leaders of these two guidance centers are from the aforementioned two horizontal linkages of 
homeowners, respectively.
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learning between homeowners. The emergence of these intermediating organizations is the 
result of overlapping interests between the state agencies and social actors. The state needs 
social stability. For the specific state agencies, if disputes can be decreased by building more 
homeowner organizations, it counts towards their work achievements (zhengji). The state’s 
provision of financial subsidies to these social organizations could be understood as the 
state’s purchase of social services.19 Social actors directing these new organizations said they 
wanted to take advantage of the opportunity to propel the activities which are meaningful for 
the development of society. They know that the state does need their services, and that state 
sponsorship can bring stability to running social organizations. 
The two-track approach has been implemented for only about a year, and then has been 
halted. The situation confirmed as of September 2012 is that after completing an experimental 
application at one district in Beijing, further expansion of incorporation has stopped. 
Meanwhile, opinions of social actors have been sought for evaluating the implementation of 
the incorporation plan. The Housing Construction Committee of the Beijing city has invited 
Governance and Community Institute—a well-known horizontal linkage of homeowners, 
which has also played an active role during the legislation process—to make an across-the-
board evaluation of the new local Ordinance. This implies that social actors have played a 
certain role even in providing feedback or evaluation of the given policy. According to Fulda 
et al. (2012), social actors’ turning expert knowledge into policy evaluation and suggestion 
constitutes an important part of state-society collaboration.  
Despite having been a revolutionary attempt, it has become quite unclear whether the idea 
suggested by the new Ordinance could be further implemented (Interviews August September 
2012 and  August 2014). It is largely because the deputy director of the Housing Construction 
Committee has been posted to somewhere else. Zhang Nongke was a reform-minded 
leader who has been opened to accept the requests from social actors. Under his leadership, 
Beijing Housing Construction Committee actively sought for the opinions from homeowner 
activists, and accordingly devised many clauses in the local Ordinance which are thought to 
be quite progressive at that time. It is not an exaggeration to say that without him it would 
have been impossible to issue the new Ordinance in 2010. Of course, homeowner activists 
welcomed him (Bei, 2011) yet backlash from the other side have made Mr. Zhang leave his 
post. Pushed by housing business actors (i.e. developers and management companies) who 
think their vested interests have been encroached upon by the recent changes initiated by 
the Beijing Housing Construction Committee, the deputy director was reassigned to another 
position which does not deal with property management and its legislation directly (Interview 
September 2014).20 
What is surmised from this is that property management is the sector where clash of 
interests between related stakeholders is fierce. Those who have vested interests in the 
sustenance of close relations between the state and housing related industry did not want to 
see the pendulum swing in favor of social actors. They did not want to see radical change 
19 In addition to the basic subsidy to run organizations, a performance-based subsidy (in the amount 
of ten thousand RMB per every additional Homeowners Committee established) has been offered 
(Interviews August and September 2012).
20 This story of Mr. Zhang implies that the individual leader factor still holds in the Chinese system. In 
regards to the importance of “First-in-Command (yibashou)”, see Fulda et al. (2012). Some others 
point out this factor as the shortcoming of the current system which cannot guarantee continuity of 
reform policies, adding uncertainty to the future direction.
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of the existing dynamics between relevant stakeholders in property management. However, 
even though the backlash from veto players has deterred radical reform, in regards to which 
direction future state-society relations should go in the issue domain, the voice of social 
actors have not decreased but actually continued to increase. Since there are many unresolved 
problems regarding property management, homeowners have kept up making efforts to 
deliver their voices to policy makers. A change in a major actor of Housing Construction 
Committee was not enough to reduce citizens’ interests in this issue; rather, citizen awareness 
of their legal rights has been heightened.
Now the local state is situated between old and new actors, trying to find a solution that 
can find a balance between multiple actors. The future solution in this issue domain tends to 
be sought through multi-actor involvement. Multi-actor involvement and thus coordination 
of clashing interests seems to be the macro direction of policy in this issue domain. After 
Mr. Zhang’s leave, the Beijing city government realized that one specific government agency 
cannot deal with the heavy burden, and Beijing People’s Congress came forward to take 
over. It was thought that Beijing People’s Congress is in a better position to deal with local 
legislation and collect opinions from multiple actors. Association of Lawyers in Beijing is 
also playing a role in preparation for another round of local legislation (Interviews August 
September 2014). These attempts are still under way, and seeing the final result will take 
some more years. 
With the advent of Xi Jinping era, many reports suggest that the Chinese “society” has 
shrunken and the prospect that social organizations will survive is dim.21 It also means that 
the state-sociey relationship can become strained. However, it is also premised that the space 
social actors can maneuver may differ across issue domains. In the case of private property 
rights, main social actors have testified that they have not experienced direct or indirect 
repression and that their activities have not been withered by any coercive measures by the 
state in the Xi Jinping era (Interviews August and September 2014). As aforementioned in 
introduction, the state has a range of policy options. It may not necessarily deploy the same 
measure to all segments of populations indiscriminately. Cumulative fieldwork suggests 
that the state, rather than adopting coercive measures, is more inclined towards utilizing 
conciliatory measures towards this issue domain.22
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Surrounding the issue of how private property rights are clarified and protected, the recent 
state-society dynamics have shown important evidences that the policy process in China has 
become more pluralized. The changing mode of property management in Beijing suggests 
that the request from society, the corresponding recognition of the local state, and the 
interactive communication between the two parties have produced the innovative outcome of 
local legislation in 2010. Despite meaningful breakthroughs, some limitations in the system 
have also been noticed. The implementation of some innovative idea in local legislation has 
remained incomplete. Thus, the attempt in 2010 has met with limited success. However, 
21 For instance, see Campbell (2016); Guardian (2015); South China Morning Post (2012).
22 In general, such collaborative interactions are frequently observed when social actors and the local 
state common problems to solve (Fulda et al., 2012: 684) and when social actors can supplement 
tangible and intangible resources that the state lacks.
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despite some vicissitudes, new local experiment is going on and social actors are continuing 
to make efforts to reflect their voices to policy making, thus turning themselves into virtual 
“policy entrepreneurs” (Mertha, 2009). 
To summarize, social actors in this issue domain have succeeded in political mobilization 
to a certain extent, and have become actors who can express their opinions about relevant 
policies. In that sense, social empowerment is observed, which could be counted as 
achievement of social actors. The reaction from the state has shown certain extent of 
responsiveness as they have provided the social actors with an input channel. In terms of 
policy outcome, drastic change has not occurred. Exclusive-scope experimentation in one 
specific district in Beijing has not been further expanded. However, while not dramatic in 
terms of amendment, the change of quality in governance is noticed. Departing from its 
former stance, the local state now shows the intention and willingness to interact with the 
society and pays attention to the voice of homeowners by inviting in these actors to the 
relevant local legislation process. Currently, a new version of property management-related 
local legislation is underway, and homeowner activists in Beijing are making incessant efforts 
to reflect their voices to a new legislation. 
In the sense that mutual need has constructed symbiotic (i.e. non-adversarial) statesociety 
interaction, this case is categorized as soft-soft interaction in Table 1. While avoiding direct 
confrontation, both of the state and society have interests to be engaged with each other.23 
The state tends to invite in social actors to solve pending problems and enhance quality of 
governance. Society attempts to utilize this opportunity for the advocacy of their cause. In 
this kind of state-society interaction—which is complementary in essence—, even though it 
may not bring about dramatic change to the existing institution or policy, it is highly likely 
to result in experimental application. At the same time, when both parties gain something by 
mutual engagement, the state-society relationship is likely to be collaborative.24 Although 
this cannot represent a complete picture of state-society relationship contemporary China,25 
for instance, the issue domain of environment (i.e. anti-incineration campaign) tends to 
show similar trend: the issue domains that involve urban middle-class actors who have 
legal knowledge, material resource, and networking show similar trend in state-society 
interaction.26 
This case offers implications about governance capacity and societal perception toward 
state legitimacy: in regards to urban middle-class citizens, the state has come to be aware 
that it can enhance legitimacy when they include these actors in relevant policy process and 
offer them opportunities to experience political efficacy. It is less costly and a more efficient 
way to deal with urban middle-class citizens than dire repression, unless these people cross 
the ultimate redline. Rather than leaving these people disgruntled with the system, giving 
them the actual opportunities to reflect their voices to relevant policy process can make 
23 Early works focused on emerging homeowner organizations within neighborhoods and their 
confrontational potential. However, homeowner activism has entered a more mature phase. The focus 
of this article is on the latest phase, which is non-confrontational and participatory. 
24 Making the relationship “mutually beneficial” guarantees sustainable development of a given social 
group (Spires, 2011).
25 For instance, the landscape of state-society relations would be quite different in the issue domains of 
labor, religion, and ethnicity, which are regarded as politically sensitive.
26 See how citizens have turned themselves into participants in waste sorting projects (Johnson, 2013).  
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these people feel that they have something to expect and achieve from the existing system.27 
That is the way modernized authoritarian state exerts resilience, while finding a balance 
between repression and concession: citizens with enhanced political awareness may test the 
boundary of state tolerance (Cai, 2008; Yang, 2005); however, it is better to keep them as 
an enthusiastic audience of the system. This also leads to incremental changes of the system 
and helps to avoid abrupt ones which may incur subversive impact. It is also pointed out that 
policy-based and issue-based contentions could help the state’s gaining and strengthening 
legitimacy (Liu, 2017). 
Studies of state-society relations have shown some divisions so far. Whereas the works 
focusing on state dominance has a long tradition (Bernstein, 2003; Duckett, 1998; Hsu and 
Hasmath, 2014; Hsueh, 2011; Oi, 1992, 1999; Shue, 1998; Thorton, 2013; Whyte, 1993; 
Yang, 2004), the attempts to find civil society in China have been continuously made (Brook 
and Frolic, 1997; Jude, 2007; Ma, 2005; Mertha, 2009; Saich, 2000; Tai, 2014; White, 
Howell, and Shang, 1996). Recently, the works that find nuanced interaction between the 
state and society have emerged and gained strength (Baum and Alexei Shevchenko, 1999; 
Fulda, Andreas, Yanyan Li, and Qinghua Song, 2012; Lu, 2009; Mertha, 2009; Spires, 
2011; Yang, 2005). Discussion on authoritarian resilience resonates with the latest strand 
of research that finds nuanced interaction between the state and society. As the Chinese 
authoritarianism adapts itself to changing reality, complex interdependence between the state 
and society has increased rapidly and will keep increasing. 
However, even admitting such recent trend, it seems that further specified analysis on 
authoritarian resilience is necessary. The main focus of this article has been placed upon 
private property rights and homeowners in urban China. Although it offers some implications 
about transitioning state-society relations, what has been observed about urban homeowners 
would not necessarily be equally applied to other segments of population in the Chinese 
society. It is highly likely that different strategies—so to speak, “divide and rule” strategy—
will be applied to different segments of populations. Table 1 suggests such possibility of 
internal variations within authoritarian resilience. Our field is still void of a big picture 
regarding how state-society interactions differ across issue domains and how such variations 
could bring about different implications about sustained legitimacy in contemporary China. 
Besides private property rights, through comparative research with other socio-economic 
issue domains, future studies could further theorize the resilience of China’s authoritarianism. 
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